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The attempts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute sitting heads of state have 
proven to be one of the thorniest issues for this new institution. These rest on the claim that 
there are crimes of such magnitude for which perpetrators should be prosecuted, regardless of 
their status. While it seems easy to sympathize with such claims, pragmatic considerations are 
often lost in debates of moral imperatives. This article derives insight from a comparative analysis 
of Sudan and Kenya. It unveils the existence of a triadic relationship between the ICC, 
governments under its scrutiny and local political contestants and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). This indicates that when the ICC attempts to prosecute a sitting head of 
state, it not only fails to deliver, but also endangers local political contestants and NGOs. The 
solution to this impasse might be abandoning the idea of prosecuting sitting heads of state. 
However, this requires a reconsideration of the moral imperatives underpinning the idea of 
punitive justice that the ICC embodies.   
KEYWORDS: International Criminal Court, international criminal justice, pragmatism, Sudan, Kenya 
 
INTRODUCTION  
When the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 2002, it fostered the idea that sitting 
heads of state are not immune from its scrutiny. This revolutionary idea was welcomed as the zenith 
of the international community’s attempt to punish those culpable of genocide, war crimes and 
gross human rights violations.
1
 However, some have already expressed criticism of the fact that the 
ICC seems to be inadequate to prosecute such powerful actors because of the agency that states 
retain over its provisions, and how this has generated a partial stalling of the justice debate.
2
 Others 
have also hinted at the fact that prosecutions are particularly effective in pacifying conflicts when 
they target middle- and low-level actors, instead of high-ranked officials.
3
 Furthermore, these 
discussions are often conducted with little reference to previous experiences in which the court 
                                                            
*
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∞
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1
 See, William A. Schabas, ‘International Criminal Court: The Secret of Its Success,’ Criminal Law Forum 12(4) 
(2001): 415–428. 
2
 Brett Edwards and Mattia Cacciatori, ‘The Politics of International Chemical Weapon Justice: The Case of 
Syria, 2011–2017,’ Contemporary Security Policy 39(2) (2018): 280–297. 
3
 ‘Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,’ 
https://www.pathwaysforpeace.org/ (accessed 13 August 2018). 
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attempted to hold sitting heads of state accountable for their deeds.
4
 This article aims to highlight 
the implications of ICC investigations against sitting heads of state in light of what happened during 
the investigations into Omar Al Bashir
5
 in Sudan and Uhuru Kenyatta in Kenya.
6
 The case for 
comparison rests on the idea that in both Sudan and Kenya the ICC faced the dilemmas arising from 
prosecuting the most powerful actors in the country. However, before venturing into the analysis, it 
is necessary to mention that Al Bashir and Kenyatta occupied different positions when the 
investigations started. When the warrant of arrest against Al Bashir was released on 4 March 2009, 
he had been the uncontested ruler of Sudan for 20 years. In contrast, when the Pre-Trial Chamber of 
the ICC decided to initiate the investigation against Kenyatta, Kenya’s president was Mwai Kibaki. 
However, Kenyatta’s presidential aspirations were clear even in 2009. In fact, when the ICC launched 
the investigation, Kenyatta was the head of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) political party, 
having defeated Nicholas Biwott with 2,980 votes against 622.
7
 KANU dominated Kenyan politics for 
39 years after independence. The case for comparison rests on this. With Kenyatta being so popular 
and given the historical and political importance of KANU, it seems hard to believe that the ICC did 
not consider the fact that Kenyatta might win the political elections in 2013. Kenyatta eventually 
defeated Raila Odinga, with 50.03 percent of the total votes cast, and became the fourth president 
of Kenya since independence.
8
 Pragmatically, with the election of Kenyatta and the release of the 
warrant of arrest against Al Bashir, the situations in Kenya and Sudan constituted the only times in 
which the ICC actually investigated a sitting head of state.  
Other similarities between the two situations include the colonial past of both Sudan and 
Kenya and the governmental grip on local media. Geoffrey Lugano notes that the infusion of 
                                                            
4
 Pierre Bienaimé, ‘We Asked Experts if Syrian President Bashar Assad Will Ever be Punished for War Crimes,’ 
Vice, 18 January 2016, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/jma43x/where-could-syrian-president-bashar-
assad-find-refuge (accessed 13 August 2018); Widney Brown, ‘Assad, Beware of the Long Arm of Justice,’ 
HuffPost, 13 April 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/widney-brown/assad-beware-the-long-
arm_b_9683254.html (accessed 13 August 2018); Eric Posner, ‘Assad and the Death of the International 
Criminal Court,’ Slate, 19 September 2013, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/09/failing_to_prosecute_assad_
will_be_the_death_of_the_international_criminal.html (accessed 13 August 2018).  
5
 The Sudanese president was accused of orchestrating the genocide in Darfur, where Sudanese and state-
sponsored paramilitary forces carried out systematic attacks against civilians. On 4 March 2009 the ICC issued 
a warrant of arrest against him for seven counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. On 12 July 2010, 
the court issued a second warrant, adding the genocide of Sudanese tribes to the charges. 
6
 Kenyatta was indicted in connection with the postelection violence that plagued Kenya in 2007/2008. During 
an unprecedented wave of brutality, 1,200 people died and 600,000 were displaced in the postelectoral 
turmoil. In October 2011, he was charged with five counts of crimes against humanity and became, in 2014, 
the first head of state to appear before the ICC.   
7
 ‘Kenyatta Wins Moi Party Election,’ BBC News, 1 February 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4222655.stm (accessed 13 August 2018). 
8
 International Crisis Group, ‘Kenya’s 2013 Elections,’ 17 January 2013, 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenya-s-2013-elections (accessed 13 August 2018).  
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anticolonial narratives was prominent among the various strategies deployed by the Al Bashir and 
Kenyatta governments to hamper ICC actions in the two situations.
9
 This is corroborated in this 
article, and seems to support the idea that countries with a strong colonial legacy are more 
susceptible to the dynamics of the exposure cycle (discussed later). As noted by Alex de Waal, the 
Sudanese colonial experience has been a peculiar one.
10
 In fact, British engagement with the country 
‘began as an adjunct to strategic interests in Egypt…to stop France controlling the Suez Canal and 
hence the sea route to India.’
11
 The antiwestern sentiment that underpinned colonial Africa from the 
1920s helped forge an alliance between Sudan and Egypt against the British colonizers. So 
anticolonial narratives have constituted a cornerstone of Sudanese politics since the 1920s.
12
 
Similarly, anticolonial policies have been a crucial part of recent Kenyan history. Kenya formally 
achieved independence from Britain in 1963, the culmination of a process that started in the 1950s 
with the Mau Mau rebellion.
13
 The colonial past of the two countries constitutes fertile ground for 
infusing anticolonial narratives in relation to ICC investigations, and hence sustains the comparability 
of the two situations.  
Furthermore, the ability of a government to control and manipulate public media makes the 
infusion of such narratives much more likely to be effective. In Sudan, freedom of the press was 
nominally granted under the provisions adopted in the framework of the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA). However, in 2009 the Sudanese government passed the Press and 
Publications Act, which allows for restrictions in the interests of national security. According to the 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) Freedom House, the 2015 Freedom of Information Law 
includes 12 categories of exemptions to protect information from public release. For example, the 
case of the editor of the socialist newspaper Al-Midan, charged in 2015 with offences including 
publishing false news, is exemplificative.
14
 The editor was eventually released on bail; if convicted, 
she would have faced capital punishment.
15
 While in Kenya the situation is generally better, in 
recent years even the Kenyatta government has tightened its grip on the public press. If the 2010 
                                                            
9
 Geoffrey Lugano, ‘Counter-Shaming the International Criminal Court’s Intervention as Neocolonial: Lessons 
from Kenya,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 11(1) (2017): 9–29. 
10
 Alex de Waal, Sudan: International Dimensions to the State and Its Crisis, Crisis States Research Centre 
Occasional Paper No. 3 (2007). 
11




 See, Edmond J. Keller, ‘A Twentieth Century Model: The Mau Mau Transformation from Social Banditry to 
Social Rebellion,’ Kenya Historical Review 3(2) (1973): 189–205. 
14
 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, ‘Journalist Madiha Abdalla Convicted of Defamation by Press 
and Publications Court,’ http://www.acjps.org/journalist-madiha-abdalla-convicted-of-defamation-by-press-
and-publications-court/ (accessed 13 August 2018). 
15
 Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘Sudan Arrests Journalists, Confiscates Papers for Reporting on Inflation 
Protests,’ https://cpj.org/2018/01/sudan-arrests-journalists-confiscates-papers-for-r.php (accessed 13 August 
2018). 
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constitution did indeed expand freedom of expression and the press by impeding state interference 
with editorial independence, in 2014 the government passed the Security Laws (Amendment) Act. 
This legislation ‘allows for long prison sentences and fines for the unauthorised reporting of 
information that undermines counterterrorism investigations.’
16
 While in 2015 the Kenyan High 
Court found several parts of the legislation to be unconstitutional, the extended powers of security 
forces over the press remain intact. Freedom House furthermore reports that several bloggers were 
arrested for publishing ‘offensive’ and ‘menacing’ messages, and in 2015 alone there were at least 
19 cases of threats to or violence against journalists. This peaked with the murder by unknown 
attackers of John Kituyi, the editor of Mirror Weekly who took a particular interest in the ICC.
17
 All 
these considerations hint at the fact that Sudan and Kenya share some preconditions for the 
exposure cycle to be observable.   
Through a comparative analysis, this article reveals that two actors are most likely to be 
vulnerable to governmental retaliation when the ICC attempts to prosecute sitting heads of state: 
local political contestants and NGOs. The article focuses on prosecutions of sitting heads of state as 
emblematic of the challenges that the ICC faces in prosecuting high-ranked officials. Given the 
considerations above, its provisions are potentially valid for all prosecutions that target politically 
sensitive figures because of the ability of such actors to manipulate the justice discourse and infuse 
it with narratives of colonialism, nationalism and martyrization.  
 
PROSECUTING SITTING HEADS OF STATE: EVOLUTION 
OF AN IDEA 
The notion that sitting heads of state are not immune to the scrutiny of international tribunals is 
now well recognized,
18
 and emerged in international jurisprudence in instances like the Charles 
Taylor case before the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the Augusto Pinochet case before 
the British House of Lords. Institutionally, the practice evolved along with the proliferation of the 
                                                            
16
 Freedom House, ‘Kenya,’ 10 March 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/kenya 
(accessed 13 August 2018). 
17
 Murithi Mutiga, ‘Journalist’s Murder Prompts Fears for Press Freedom in Kenya,’ Guardian, 3 May 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/03/journalists-prompts-fears-for-press-freedom-in-kenya 
(accessed 13 August 2018).  
18
 Joanne Foakes, ‘Immunity for International Crimes? Developments in the Law on Prosecuting Heads of State 
in Foreign Courts,’ 2011, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/179865 (accessed 13 
August 2018); Salvatore Zappalà, ‘Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for 
International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case before the French Cour de Cassation,’ European Journal of 
International Law 12(3) (2001): 595–612.  
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UN-sponsored ad hoc tribunals of the mid-1990s
19
 and encapsulates the idea of crimes of such 
magnitude that they need to be addressed, regardless of where or by whom they were committed.
20
 
The institutional zenith of this practice is the ICC. Article 27 of the underpinning treaty of the court, 
the Rome Statute, clarifies that: 
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case 
exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, 
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, 
whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over such a person.
21
  
While nowadays prosecutions are hardwired in international politics as the only means to redress 
human rights violations, the subject was heavily contested in the 1980s and 1990s. Two schools of 
thought, pragmatism and legalism, debated the mechanisms and policies that societies should 
implement to cope with gross human rights violations.
22
 On one side, pragmatist arguments, which 
emerged after the third wave of democratization in South America and Eastern Europe, were infused 
with the idea that punishment for gross human rights violations could be postponed during 
situations of delicate political transformation. Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri argue that 
‘pragmatists believe that justice, in its prosecutorial acceptation, could be more pursuable in a later 
stage of the transitional process, when institutions are stronger.’
23
 Instead of favouring a false sense 
of justice achieved, pragmatists argue that the international community should prioritize the needs 
of societies directly affected by gross human rights violations.
24
   
                                                            
19
 Cesare P.R. Romano, ‘The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle,’ NYU 
Journal of International Law and Politics 31(4) (1999): 709–751. 
20
 Larry May, ‘Le Norme Dello Jus Cogens e il Diritto Penale Internazionale,’ Ars Interpretandi 6 (2001): 223–
248. 
21
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Pub. L. No. A/CPMF.183/9 (1998). 
22
 Lucy Marie Keller, ‘UNTAC in Cambodia: From Occupation, Civil War and Genocide to Peace,’ in Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law (vol. 9), ed. Armin von Bogdandy and Rüdiger Wolfrum (Heidelberg: Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 2005).  
23
 Leslie Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder, ‘Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of International War Crime 
Tribunals and Transitional Justice,’ Annual Review of Political Science 7(1) (2004): 345–346. 
24
 Charles Chernor Jalloh, ‘Africa and the International Criminal Court: Collision Course or Cooperation,’ North 
Carolina Central Law Review 34 (2012): 203–229. 
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Diametrically opposed to the pragmatist approach, legalism has potently argued against the 
creation of impunity gaps for gross human rights violations since the mid-1990s.
25
 Legalist literature 
advances that the prosecution of perpetrators of gross human rights violations can redeem the 
suffering of victims, have a significant effect on both preventing and deterring future reiterations of 
violations, and serve as an educational example of rule of law for societies in transition to 
democracies, and for authoritarian regimes and failed states.
26
 As noted, the proliferation of ad hoc 
tribunals in the 1990s declared legalism the victor of the pragmatist/legalist divide. The watershed in 
this sense was 1994, the year when the last fully restorative mechanisms – the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda – were 
established.
27
   
While it is easy to sympathize with the idea that sitting heads of state should be held accountable 
for their actions, the legalist turn of the international arena tends to overlook the fact that the 
consequences of international actions will live on in the societies in which investigations take place. 
Traditionally, criticisms of the legalist approach focus on the fact that it is externally imposed, that it 
creates divisions in situations of social ngineering, and that it is a forceful imposition of westernized 
justice in contexts where this concept is ali n. The application of this concept seems to indicate that, 
as happened in Sudan and Kenya, prosecutions against sitting heads of state are likely to trigger a 
domino effect that endangers local political contestants and NGOs operating in the countries under 
investigation. This claim is potentially valid for any investigation that aims to hold accountable those 
in positions of power. This article’s focus on sitting heads of state is rooted in the idea that these 
actions constitute the most evident assault on sovereign statehood and, as such, the dynamics of 
exposition encapsulated by the analytical model proposed are more likely to be observed.  
The remaining argument unfolds in three parts. First, the exposure cycle is conceptualized. The 
article then looks at how ICC investigations influenced domestic political dynamics in the contexts of 
the prosecutions of Al Bashir and Kenyatta. This section outlines how these court actions justified 
the marginalization of political contestation by enabling both governments to politicize the 
investigations and blame political contestants for cooperating with neo-imperialist forces. The article 
then elucidates how the creation of this neo-imperialist narrative set the basis for massive 
                                                            
25
 Geneviève Parent, ‘Reconciliation and Justice after Genocide: A Theoretical Exploration,’ Genocide Studies 
and Prevention 5(3) (2010): 277–292. 
26
 Phil Clark, ‘Hybridity, Holism, and Traditional Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide 
Rwanda,’ George Washington International Law Review 39(4) (2007): 765–837. 
27
 While the experiences in Sierra Leone and Liberia still had a restorative dimension, they also had a very 
strong punitive component. In Sierra Leone, the SCSL was tasked with adjudicating those responsible for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity that occurred after the civil war of 1996. The Liberian TRC, unlike the 
South African one, only had the power to recommend amnesties to the Liberian government and not to 
directly grant them.  
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retaliatory practices against NGOs in the two countries. It also briefly reviews the history of the 
relationship between the two countries and NGOs, in order to show that more than just generating 
hostility, ICC investigations sustained and amplified it. Lastly, the article concludes that the Sudanese 
and Kenyan experiences should be considered when debating the possibilities of prosecuting sitting 
heads of state. In this sense, a comparative analysis of the Sudanese and Kenyan situations should 
constitute the basis for understanding the challenges that this practice faces. It is hoped that future 
discussions about prosecuting sitting heads of state will not be stalled by principled assumptions 
about international justice but will benefit from the analytical and empirical considerations 
advanced in this article.  
 
THE ‘EXPOSURE CYCLE’ AND THE ICC’S DILEMMA 
This article contends that the e are three major actors involved directly in prosecutions against 
sitting heads of state: the ICC, governments under investigation, and political contestants and NGOs 
that operate in the country under scrutiny. Bridging these three elements of international society 
provides for a deeper understanding of the influence that prosecutions of sitting heads of state 
might have on domestic contexts. The record of the ICC’s implementation of this practice is 
worrying: out of three situations (Al Bashir in Sudan, Kenyatta in Kenya and Muammar Gaddafi in 
Libya),
28
 the court was unable to finalize a single one. The triadic conceptualization offered in this 
section should be seen as a first step to inquire into the potential consequences that this assault on 
Westphalian sovereignty might hold for domestic actors.  
To understand why the exposure cycle can lead to disastrous humanitarian consequences, it 
is necessary to stress that human rights scholarship has valued the existence of a heterogeneity of 
political voices and the work of NGOs in the protection of civilians for at least the past 15 years.
29
  
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues, for instance, argue that the existence of political 
                                                            
28
 The Libyan situation is not unpacked in detail here because the article aims at understanding the 
development of an intersubjective practice that takes time to develop. The 2011 events in Libya resulted from 
very swift international action in which the warrant of arrest by the ICC was coupled with military strategies. 
This is on the one hand problematic in terms of decoupling the ICC from North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
bombings. On the other, the speediness of the action makes it hard to observe the construction of more 
complex social dynamics such as the marginalization of political contestants or NGOs.  
29
 Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate, ‘Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global 
Analysis,’ American Political Science Review 88(4) (1994): 853–872; David Beetham, Democracy and Human 
Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 1999); Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights, Democracy, and Development,’ Human Rights 
Quarterly 21(3) (1999): 608–632; Zehra F. Arat, Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries (Lincoln, 
NE: iUniverse, 2003); Makau Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd ed.) 
(London: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
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contestation, even when minimal, is the most important institution in reducing human rights 
violations.
30
 Similarly, authors like Claire Mercer as well as Larry May and Stacey Hoffman advance 
that the supposed independence from states’ political calculations makes NGOs a quintessential 
institution for democratization and human rights.
31
 This article does not formally distinguish 
between local and international NGOs, because the Sudanese and Kenyan governments targeted 
both these actors after the ICC initiated operations in the two contexts. It is, however, important to 
note that, because of their outreach capabilities, international NGOs are more likely to draw the 
international community’s attention to human rights violations and are hence more likely to become 
the targets of authoritarian practices aimed at silencing them. However, this article shows that 
national NGOs are not immune to governmental retaliation either, especially when they voice their 
concerns on the legitimacy of the sitting government. In a sort of ‘trickle down’ effect, the work of 
both local and international NGOs becomes especially problematic for governments under ICC 
investigation, and hence both become prime targets of retaliation.    
Political pluralism and NGOs are not only related directly to the protection of human rights, 
but are also instrumental for the operations of the ICC. Within contexts of established pluralism, 
governments are more subject to domestic critiques of their behaviour, for instance when 
representatives of moderate forces in nondemocratic contexts signal the proliferation of war crimes 
or human rights violations.  
The existence of political pluralism can sustain the efforts of prosecution by providing 
evidence, victims and witnesses to the ICC. Similarly, NGOs like Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch also act as a system of checking by releasing annual reports that can sustain the claims 
for humanitarian intervention in a specific country (as happened in Kenya and Sudan).
32
 In this 
sense, both political contestants and NGOs are crucial components for implementing the ICC’s 
decisions.   
The exposure cycle bridges three sets of actors that enter a moment of high intersubjectivity 
when the ICC attempts to prosecute a sitting head of state. The relationship is visualized in Figure 1.  
                                                            
30
 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, George W. Downs, Alastair Smith and Feryal Marie Cherif, ‘Thinking inside the 
Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights,’ International Studies Quarterly 49(3) (2005): 439–457. 
31
 Larry May and Stacey Hoffman, Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied 
Ethics (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991); Claire Mercer, ‘NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization: A 
Critical Review of the Literature,’ Progress in Development Studies 2(1) (2002): 5–22. 
32
 Human Rights First, ‘The Role of Human Rights NGOs in Relation to ICC Investigations,’ September 2004, 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/NGO_Role_Discussion_Paper.pdf (accessed 12 
August 2018). 
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Figure 1. Exposure cycle 
Political contestants and NGOs expose nondemocratic governments to the scrutiny of the 
ICC and, by doing so, they support the work of the court. Similarly, the ICC, by prosecuting 
nondemocratic governments, exposes the role that political contestants and NGOs played in setting 
up the investigation. This exposure cycle leads to the repression of political contestants and NGOs, 
revealing the dangers of cooperating with the court for these two actors. The analysis that follows 
focuses on the last moment of relation between nondemocratic governments, political contestants 
and NGOs.
33
 Because local political contestants and NGOs also contribute to the ICC’s evidence-
gathering mechanism, the existence of the exposure cycle creates a quasi-paradoxical situation in 
which: i) local political contestants and NGOs are essential instruments for the ICC to attempt to 
prosecute sitting heads of state; and ii) the mere possibility of an ICC action against a sitting head of 
state endangers political contestants and NGOs.   
This gives birth to the ‘ICC’s dilemma.’ On the one hand, moderate political formations and 
NGOs could support the ICC in an attempt to expose governments under scrutiny and gain political 
relevance. On the other, they are aware that any form of cooperation with the ICC is likely to result 
in their marginalization. 
  
                                                          
33
 The other relational moments emerge implicitly from the analysis. They entail highlighting how political 
contestants exploited human rights narratives to undermine the party subject to ICC investigation; how NGOs 
tried to alert the international community to human rights violations; and how this sustained calls for 
prosecution by the ICC. 
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SILENCING CONTESTATION: THE ICC AND DOMESTIC 
POLITICAL DYNAMICS 
Sudan: Closing the Ranks behind Al Bashir 
The history between Al Bashir and the ICC can be traced back to early 2005, when a UN report 
accused the Sudanese government of systematic abuses in Darfur.
34
 Following the publication of the 
report, the UN Security Council referred those accused of war crimes in Darfur to the ICC. The first 
signs of an embryonic tension between Sudan and the ICC appeared when, in 2007, ICC judges 
issued their first arrest warrants for Ahmed Haroun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, with Al 
Bashir claiming that the court did not have jurisdiction over Sudan. Shortly after this, members of 
the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) that were included in the government of 
national unity as a result of the peace deal brokered in 2005, and that historically supported the 
ICC,
35
 suspended their participation in the government.
36
 Representatives of rebel forces in Sudan 
continued in their support for the ICC even when they themselves were faced with allegations. 
Illustrative is the case of Abu Garda, who voluntarily went to The Hague and was dismissed by the 
judges of the ICC because of insufficient evidence.
37
  
In 2008, tensions between the Sudanese government and the ICC escalated when the then 
prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, asked the judges of the court for an arrest warrant for Al Bashir. 
The warrant was eventually released on 4 March 2009, charging Al Bashir with seven counts of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, making the Sudanese president the first sitting head of state to 
be indicted. Shortly after the release of the arrest warrant, many leaders of the African Union stated 
that they would not have cooperated with the court on the matter. In 2010, along with the peace 
deal signed between the Justice and Equality Movement and the Al Bashir government, the 
Sudanese president faced a second arrest warrant that included charges of genocide. The spillover 
effects of these dynamics between the ICC and Al Bashir are outlined below, with particular 
reference to the fact that the ‘internationalist’ and comparatively more moderate line within the 
National Congress Party (NCP) was marginalized as it jarred with Al Bashir’s strategy to derail the 
investigation.     
                                                            
34
 ICC, ‘Darfur, Sudan,’ https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur (accessed 13 August 2018). 
35
 Sarah M.H. Nouwen and Wouter G. Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court 
in Uganda and Sudan,’ European Journal of International Law 21(4) (2010): 941–965. 
36
 Sudan Tribune, ‘SPLM Withdraw from Sudan National Unity Government,’ 
http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24184 (accessed 13 August 2018). 
37
 ‘Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,’ ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber I (8 February 2010).  
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The influence of ICC proceedings on Sudanese politics is not limited to the different positions 
of the leaders of Darfuri movements and Sudanese authorities.
38
 Mohamed el-Shabik notes that, in 
the 2010s, ‘the National Congress Party (NCP) gradually shifted away from permitting small degrees 
of openness to adopting the tyranny of absolutism.’
39
 In fact, after the expiration of the CPA in 
2010
40
 and the release of the second arrest warrant against Al Bashir,
41
 the more ‘international’ line 
within the NCP was progressively marginalized. The figure that most embodied a will to engage more 
proactively with international actors was Sudan’s vice-president, Ali Osman Taha. Einas Ahmed, 
associate researcher at Les Afriques dans Le Monde, argues that Taha ‘has a reputation of a 
statesman, with a distinguished history in the National Islamic Front (NIF), and with good 
communication skills and rapport with international actors.’
42
 Taha was incredibly popular after the 
signing of the CPA agreement,
43
 having been described by many observers as the true mind behind 
it.
44
 The ‘New Sudan’ envisioned by him would encompass being more open to international actors 
as well as transforming the structure of the NCP to allow for more contestation of Al Bashir’s rule.
45
 
Taha’s stance is best exemplified by his critiques of the Al Bashir government for not cooperating 
with international forces to solve the Darfur crisis.
46
 The Sudan Tribune noted that the CPA lay at the 
heart of the differences between Taha and Al Bashir, with the former pushing to appoint ministers 
loyal to the CPA, and the latter de facto appointing ministers hostile to it.
47
 If Taha’s internationalism 
was an asset for the CPA, it became a problem after the release of the arrest warrants. It is worth 
noting that Taha, unlike members of the SPLM, has consistently opposed the ICC. But Taha’s 
international outlook clashed with the infusion of antiwestern narratives so central to Al Bashir’s 
strategy against the ICC.   
                                                            
38
 For a full account of these positions, see, Nouwen and Werner, supra n 35. 
39
 Mohamed el-Shabik, ‘Omar Al-Bashir’s Cabinet Reshuffle and Absolute Rule in Sudan,’ 
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40
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 ICC, ‘Al Bashir Case,’ https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir (accessed 13 August 2018). 
42
 Gunnar M. Sørbø and Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, eds., Sudan Divided: Continuing Conflict in a Contested State 
(New York: Springer, 2013), 82. 
43
 Alex de Waal, ‘Darfur, the Court and Khartoum: The Politics of State Non-Cooperation,’ in Courting Conflict? 
Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, ed. Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark (London: Royal African Society, 2008). 
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In 2011, some months after the release of the second warrant of arrest
48
 and one year after 
South Sudan formally parted from the North, Taha started to progressively lose influence in tandem 
with Al Bashir’s boost in popularity. This eventually led to Taha’s resignation in 2013, and the 
strengthening of the alliance between his historical rival Nafie Ali Nafie and Al Bashir.
49
 While the 
official position is that Taha stepped down ‘voluntarily because he supported the change to open 
more opportunities to the new generations,’
50
 many have speculated that in fact he was forced out 
of office because of his international stance.
51
 The resignation of Taha, at least symbolically, echoes 
what Al Bashir said earlier in 2013:   
the decision of the ICC prosecutor is already solidifying our internal front, the internal front 
of our Sudanese people, and that is the source of our power and we will fight their actions.
52
  
This solidification manifested in the appointment of ministers who were loyal to him, like Nafie, 
and the appointment as vice-president of Lieutenant General Bakri Hassan Salih, a loyalist of the Al 
Bashir regime.
53
 The appointment of Salih and the solidification of the Al Bashir–Nafie relationship, 
as well as the marginalization of oppositional leaders like Taha, are strongly linked. As noted by 
Patrick Wegner:  
The rally effect for al Bashir can be measured in the loss of influence of the comparatively 
moderate Vice President Ali Osman Taha, who was very powerful between 2005 and 2007 
after the CPA agreement. He was eclipsed by hardliner Nafie Al Nafie, a hardliner and one of 
the major supporters of the violent governmental strategies in Darfur.
54
  
                                                            
48
 The release of the second warrant of arrest is of particular significance. Before 2009, no sitting head of state 
had ever been prosecuted by an international tribunal, so it was unclear how serious and credible the ICC was. 
However, the release of the second warrant of arrest against Al Bashir, the opening of the investigation in 
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sitting heads of state to justice. As such, the second warrant of arrest against Al Bashir has to be considered 
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To summarize, the infusion of antiwestern sentiments in the Sudanese society eased the 
solidification of the ranks of the NCP, and the marginalization of those who promoted more 
cooperation with international actors. In fact, some argued that the warrants of arrest issued by the 
ICC increased Al Bashir’s motivation to remain in power.
55
 Furthermore, the prosecution justified the 
potent revival of longstanding antiwestern narratives.
56
 Evidence of this can be found, for example, 
in a statement made by a presidential advisor to Al Bashir who said  ‘that the Western media 
campaign around the Darfur conflict served to cover up the US failure in Iraq.’
57
 Al Bashir himself 
sustained this view in 2010, claiming that ‘Crusaders and Zionists were targeting Muslims all over the 
world.’
58
 Al Bashir’s desire to hamper the ICC’s investigation via the promotion of antiwestern 
narratives jarred with Taha’s international profile and comparatively moderate stance. The 
combination of these factors resulted in more and more people starting to support Al Bashir after 
the start of the investigations.
59
 As testimony to this, huge demonstrations with thousands rallying in 
Khartoum followed the announcement by the ICC of the indictment of Al Bashir,
60
 with the army and 
several tribe members swearing oaths of allegiance to the Sudanese president.
61
 As a result, the ICC 
progressively lost legitimacy in Sudan, as demonstrated by the numerous manifestations of solidarity 
that many Sudanese pledged to their president. In a context in which any foreign meddling with 
Sudanese affairs has been effectively depicted as neo-imperialism, the ICC warrants of arrest 
solidified Al Bashir’s accusations against the more internationalist forces within the NCP, such as 
Taha.  
 
Kenya: Formation of the Jubilee Alliance  
Tracing the history of the pre-2007 coalition strategies explains ho  William Ruto and Kenyatta, who 
became, respectively, vice-president and president of Kenya in 2013, at the time stood on opposite 
sides. Kenyan electoral preferences are still largely determined by ethnicity and kinship, with the 
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most prominent tribes being the Kalenjin, the Kikuyu and the Luo.
62
 At the time of the 2007 
elections, Kibaki represented the dominant Kikuyu ethnic group, particularly dominant in central 
Kenya. His main contestant, Odinga, stood for the Luo ethnic group. Odinga was especially popular in 
western Kenya, in the Rift Valley and in the Coast Province, and represented the Luhya and the 
Kalenjin groups, as well as Muslims from the Coast Province. At the time of the electoral campaign, 
the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)-Kenya coalition, led by Odinga, was widely considered the 
fiercest opponent of Kibaki. Among those who left the ODM, the present-day president, Kenyatta, 
turned from opposing Kibaki to supporting him. The new coalition that formed on the ashes of the 
ODM-Kenya alliance, the Party of National Unity (PNU), encompassed members of Kibaki’s political 
party and former members of the opposition like Kenyatta, and drew support from ethnic groups 
such as the Kalenjin and the Luo. The opposition to the PNU was composed mainly of members of 
the original ODM, including Ruto. Kenyatta and Ruto were not just politically opposed, but also came 
from different cultural backgrounds – Kenyatta represented the Kikuyu, while Ruto represented the 
Kalenjin.
63
   
From this perspective, it is interesting to question the extent to which it is possible to claim 
that the ICC sustained a coalition between the two, embodied in the formation of the Jubilee 
Alliance. When the widely contested Electoral Commission of Kenya declared Kibaki the winner of 
the 2007 election, it fuelled widespread tension over the fairness of the electoral process. In this 
context, Kenya experienced an unprecedented wave of violence. Over a period of two months, after 
the presidential elections of 27 December 2007, more than 1,000 people were killed and at least 
700,000 were displaced.
64
 As a consequence of international pressures, the ICC opened an 
investigation proprio motu to shed some light on the violent events that characterized the formation 
of the Jubilee Alliance that eventually won the 2010 elections.   
On 31 March 2010, two years after the wave of violence had ended, the Pre-Trial Chamber II 
of the ICC opened the investigation following serious allegations of governmental involvement in the 
violence. In early April 2011, six suspects (the ‘Ocampo six,’ named after the head prosecutor of the 
ICC at that time) appeared voluntarily before the court, including the deputy prime minister, two 
cabinet ministers and the former head of the police force.
65
 The investigation was split into two 
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of Legal Studies 3(1) (2009): 78–95. 
63
 Susanne D. Mueller, ‘Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): Politics, the Election and the Law,’ 
Journal of Eastern African Studies 8(1) (2014): 25–42. 
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AFP/ILP 1 (2013), 2. 
65
 The confirmation of charges hearings in Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, and 
Joshua Arap Sang ICC-01/09-01/11 took place from 1 to 8 September 2011; the confirmation of charges 
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cases. In the first group the ICC accused Ruto, Henry Kosgey and Joshua Sang. These three all 
belonged to the Kalenjin community, accused of targeting Kikuyu supporters of Kibaki in the north of 
the Rift Valley.
66
 These crimes were ‘allegedly committed against PNU supporters as part of a plan to 
gain power in the northern parts of Rift Valley Province, and to punish and drive out PNU 
supporters.’
67
 The second case was directed against Francis Muthaura, Kenyatta and Muhammed 
Hussein Ali for allegedly hiring a Kikuyu militia to retaliate against ODM’s anti-Kikuyu preelectoral 
violence.
68
   
Echoing what happened in Sudan, the inquiry raised the stakes for those under investigation 
to access power. As Susanne Mueller notes, ‘winning the election was part of a key Defense strategy 
to undercut the ICC by seizing political power, flexing it to deflect the ICC, and opening up the 
possibility of not showing up for trial if all else failed.’
69
 In this sense, the investigation fuelled the 
formation of the Jubilee Alliance between Kenyatta and Ruto for the 2013 elections
70
 because, as 
noted by Christine Bjork and Juanita Goebertus, winning the elections in this context meant also 
being able to derail the investigation.
71
  
Along with the alliance signed by Kenyatta and Ruto, the most prominent oppositional figure 
to the Jubilee Alliance, Odinga, started losing credibility. Questions about him being left out of the 
Ocampo six, or about a radio station leader being indicted (Sang) while others remained free to 
voice their concerns, strengthened the view that the trial was as politicized as Kenyatta and Ruto 
claimed.
72
 With the two explicitly accusing Odinga of conspiring with foreigners against them,
73
 once 
the court named and charged suspects, support for the ICC dropped, particularly in the heartlands of 
the accused, the Central Province and the Rift Valley. In 2010,  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
hearings in Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Muhammed Hussein Ali ICC-
01/09-02/11 took place from 21 September to 5 October 2011. However, one of the three Pre-Trial Chamber 
judges issued a dissenting opinion, arguing that it was not clear that the alleged crimes against humanity were 
committed as part of a calculated ‘organizational policy’ to attack civilians, as stipulated in the Rome Statute. 
See, ‘Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul to Pre-Trial Chamber II’s “Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang”,’ 
ICC-01/09-01/11-2, https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?uri=1039488 (accessed 13 August 2018); art. 
7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute; L. Muthoni Wanyeki, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Cases in Kenya: Origin 
and Impact,’ Institute for Security Studies Paper No. 237 (2012).   
66
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68% of the country wanted the ICC to prosecute the suspects, including 73% in Central 
Province and 61% in the Rift Valley…By mid-July 2013, only 39% of those polled wanted trials 
to take place in The Hague, falling to only 7% in Central Province and 24% in Rift Valley.
74
   
As a consequence of this decreased support for the ICC, and the progressive scepticism that 
plagued Odinga’s reputation, Kenyatta and Ruto both gained popularity. This was due to a 
commonly expressed opinion that the ICC’s intervention was a political ploy by Odinga and his 
purported ‘western allies’ to ensure the electoral victory of the Coalition for Reform and Democracy 
(CORD). In this narrative, Odinga is seen to bear greater responsibility for the 2007/2008 
postelection crisis. As noted by Gabrielle Lynch and Miša Zgonec-Rožej, the formation of the Jubilee 
Alliance, and the investigations against Kenyatta and Ruto ‘boosted their popularity among parts of 
the Kenyan electorate that dispute ICC allegations that the post-election violence of 2007–08 was 
pre-planned by organized ethnic networks.’
75
 This echoes what happened in Sudan, when Taha 
progressively lost support in concomitance with the increasing antiwestern sentiment in the country, 
resulting in a boost of popularity for Al Bashir.  
So the ICC fuelled the creation of the Jubilee Alliance among two forces that had historically 
opposed each other, while undermining the only other credible candidate. In fact, the partiality of 
the ICC investigation in Kenya, which made clear a priori that Odinga was not to be investigated, 
allowed members of the Jubilee Alliance to rally against the former president and blame him for 
cooperating with neocolonialist western powers. The marginalization of Odinga, and the 
normalization of the relationship between Kenyatta and Ruto, led to the victory of the Jubilee 
Alliance in 2013. Since the Jubilee Alliance won by a very narrow margin, it seems legitimate to 
speculate that this would not have happened without the formation of the ‘Uhuruto’ coalition. Here 
lies the most evident difference between the two cases. Because of the diverse electoral 
apparatuses of the two countries, Al Bashir politicized the operations of the ICC, not to build an 
alliance to win the elections (he did not need to), but rather to close the ranks behind him. Through 
instrumentalizing the court, Kenyatta got rid of Odinga. Concurrently, he ensured that the leader of 
the CORD and Ruto did not form a winning coalition by offering Ruto a safe way to escape 
prosecution through the formation of the Jubilee Alliance.   
In summary, the two situations illustrate the relationship between political pluralism and ICC 
investigations against heads of state in two ways: first, these are likely to raise the stakes for those 
under investigation to maintain or access power (and, by doing so, to derail prosecutions). Second, 
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investigations can influence the creation or disaggregation of political alliances by providing the 
discursive structures to justify the infusion of neo-imperialist discourses in the electoral process. 
Along with the deterioration of the ICC’s credibility, this marginalized Taha in Sudan and Odinga in 
Kenya.  
BACKLASHES ON NGOs 
Sudan and NGOs: ‘First-Class Espionage’ 
Wegner argues that the Al Bashir government’s opposition to NGOs is not something that emerged 
in 2009, after the issuing of arrest warrants. He details three moments that clearly illustrate the 
Sudanese president’s longstanding animosity towards NGOs. As early as 28 October 2004, the 
president called western aid agencies ‘enemies of Sudan’
76
 and in March 2005 the government 
accused ‘Oxfam, MSF [Médecins sans Frontières/Doctors without Borders] and the Norwegian 




After the opening of the investigation by the ICC in June 2005, governmental hostility 
towards NGOs became particularly evident. The case of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) is 
indicative of how NGOs found themselves in a difficult situation after 2005. Protection programme 
coordinator Joseph Aguettant circulated a memorandum in 2005 that outlined guidelines for IRC 
cooperation with the court, justifying cooperation ‘because the ICC’s work would help Sudan’s 
people and bring criminals to justice.’
78
 IRC spokeswoman Melissa Winkler at first acknowledged the 
IRC’s serious consideration of Aguettant’s proposal but later denied that the memorandum was 
given any serious consideration.
79
 ‘The draft document was reviewed by IRC senior management and 
rejected as IRC policy,’ Winkler said, commenting further that ‘the policy that was later adopted 
specifically directs IRC staff members not to communicate in any way with the ICC and not to 
support ICC investigations.’
80
 On 21 February 2006, the Al Bashir government ‘passed the 
Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act, requiring NGOs to register with the 
Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), which started obstructing the work of the agencies by different 
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 and in 2007 ‘president Al Bashir started to encourage attacks on 
humanitarian aid workers.’
82
 In the weeks following the opening of the investigation, Al Bashir 
intensified the ‘surveillance of opposition and human rights organizations.’
83
 In this sense, much like 
the revival of colonial narratives, what happened after the issuing of the arrest warrants in 2009 
seems an amplification of longstanding tensions. The argument is not so much that prosecuting 
sitting heads of state creates tensions with NGOs ex novo. Rather, as soon as the ICC gets too close 
to the most powerful, tightening the governmental grip on NGOs becomes even more important in 
the authoritarian playbook. If from 2005 to 2009 the tension between the government and NGOs 
manifested in the form of threats (or expulsions of single agencies), since 2009 the government has 
implemented the threats in the form of a mass expulsion.   
In fact, hours after the warrant of arrest against Al Bashir was issued, the government of 
Sudan immediately expelled 14 international aid agencies.
84
 Well-known NGOs expelled from Darfur 
include the French aid organization MSF, Britain’s Oxfam and the American NGO CARE. The IRC was 
one of the initial foreign humanitarian NGOs expelled by Sudan’s government for allegedly 
cooperating with the ICC.
85
 Despite the 2005 controversy outlined above, the IRC continued to 
operate in Sudan until the ICC released the warrants of arrest. Kurt Tjossem, who oversees IRC 
programmes in the Horn and East Africa, declared in 2009 that: 
The final IRC staff have now left northern Sudan following an exhausting, distressing and 
frustrating two-month process, which included the forced closure of our offices, seizure of 
assets and termination of staff contracts.
86
  
Accusations against them by Sudan’s UN envoy Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem ranged from 
assisting the ICC investigation to ‘first-class espionage.’
87
 Al Bashir echoed these words by saying that 
he would act ‘decisively’ against anyone threatening the country’s stability.
88
 This is an interesting 
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dynamic because it highlights that, in the grammar of the Al Bashir government, NGOs became spies 
of the West that should be expelled.   
The remarks from high-ranked members of the NCP, coupled with the timing of the 
expulsions, seem to leave little room for doubt regarding the relationship between the ICC’s 
investigation and the government’s tightening grip on NGOs. Even by assuming that the warrants of 
arrest merely provided a justification for Al Bashir to harshen longstanding policies, it is legitimate to 
ask if the governmental stance towards NGOs would have developed in the same way without the 
ICC’s involvement, and also without the ICC going after Al Bashir.  
 
Kenya and NGO ‘Terrorism’  
Comparatively, the situation in Kenya for civil society groups followed a similar pattern to the one in 
Sudan. Many analysts claim that civil society groups, and among them a plethora of NGOs, which  
had been highly effective in voter education and electoral observation over the previous 15 
years did not perform as well in 2007, perhaps because they now found themselves divided 
in their political loyalties.
89
   
In Kenya as well, governmental hostility towards NGOs can be traced back to well before the 
ICC investigations. Cecelia Lynch identifies three rounds characterizing the tension between the 
Kenyan government and NGOs since the early 1990s.
90
  
That said, the investigations against Kenyatta and Ruto in 2009 revived the debate about the role 
of NGOs in the country and led to the perception that some of those groups represented 
‘illegitimate external interference in Kenyan politics.’
91
 Peter Aling’o and Sebastian Gatimu have no 
doubt about the relationship between the ICC and the expulsion of NGOs. They argue that the Public 
Benefits Organizations’ Act was nothing more than governmental retaliation. This is particularly 
evident in a report they wrote for the Institute of Strategic Studies in Nairobi, where they claim that:   
the current siege on NGOs can be traced back to the 2007/8 post-election violence and the 
subsequent indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of President Kenyatta and his 
Deputy, William Ruto. NGOs are perceived by the ruling Jubilee coalition and its supporters to 
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have provided critical help to the ICC in collecting evidence and preparing witnesses in the 
ongoing Kenyan ICC cases, and consistently advocating for accountability and justice through 
the continuation of the cases.
92
  
The Act resulted in the suspension of the registration of 525 NGOs in the country and the freezing 
of their accounts.
93
 The Kenyan NGOs Coordination Board executive director, Fazul Mahamed Yusuf, 
declared that 15 of these 525 were linked to ‘criminal activities including terrorism. The 
investigations are being finalised and the people behind them will be prosecuted soon.’
94
 Aling’o and 
Gatimu claim that ‘this kind of clampdown on civil society is the hallmark of authoritarian 
governments with a low tolerance for independent critical voices.’
95
 According to the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, ‘many fear that the government is using the threat posed by al-Shabab to 
curb democratic freedoms.’
96
 The clampdown on NGOs, as happened in Sudan, impacted on both 
local and international agencies.   
But the link between the ICC’s actions and governmental retaliation against NGOs is even clearer 
in Kenya than it was in Sudan. In fact, NGOs and humanitarian agencies led (and in many ways 
continue to lead) the process for demanding accountability from the Kenyatta government. A press 
release issued by the Kenyan International Commission of Jurists reads:  
we…call upon these accused persons [including Kenyatta and Ruto] to vacate office of their 
own volition in pursuant to the statements they issued also on the 15th December 2010 to 
cooperate with the ICC.
97
   
Similarly, Gladwell Otieno, Africa Centre for Open Governance executive director, voiced 
concerns about electoral irregularities in attempting to bring the case in front of the court. The 
tension between NGOs and the Kenyatta government reached the international stage at the 
Assembly of State Parties in The Hague, where a coalition of local and international NGOs sustained 
the ICC’s claims that the Kenyatta government was tampering with evidence. Otieno claimed that 
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‘the Kenya case has run into unprecedented challenges, with eight witnesses dead/disappeared in 
one case [Kenyatta’s], and another 16 out of 42 prosecution witnesses in another case 
withdrawing/recanting their testimony.’
98
 In this sense, Otsieno Namwaya, Africa researcher at 
Human Rights Watch, argues convincingly that the government’s tightening grip on NGOs should not 
have taken anyone by surprise. Precisely because of the active role of NGOs and civil society groups 
in advocating in favour of the ICC, ‘the Jubilee party had made it very clear that it would seek to 
control NGOs [if] it comes to power.’
99
 In essence, as soon as Kenyatta and Ruto had the power to do 
so, they immediately sent a message to those who supported their indictments.   
All in all, the Sudanese and Kenyan cases support the idea that ICC investigations against 
heads of state are likely to trigger authoritarian retaliation on civil society groups. This view finds 
echoes in the 2009 Sudanese expulsion of roughly 20 NGOs, as well as the deregistration of more 
than 500 organizations in Kenya. While international NGOs are generally more likely to attract the 
interest of the government because of their international outreach, retaliation against local NGOs 
was present in the two situations and followed very similar dynamics. In fact, both international and 
local NGOs can help the ICC in sustaining cases against the most powerful in a country, by publishing 
reports and acting as red lights in times of humanitarian crisis. Precisely for this reason, when the ICC 
gets too close to the highest circles of power, the government’s tightening grip on NGOs becomes 
essential for those who want to derail the investigation. The consequences of NGO expulsions are, of 
course, not just political. According to the Integrated Regional Information Networks, halting NGO 
operations would leave 1.1 million Sudanese without food, 1.5 million without healthcare and at 
least one million without drinking water.
100
 Similarly, in the mid-2000s, NGOs and their networks 
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To conclude, it seems that ICC investigations in Sudan and Kenya helped write another page in the 
authoritarian playbook. Two propositions advanced in this article bear consideration. First, after 
seven years of contestation, the prosecutions against both Al Bashir and Kenyatta have reached an 
impasse. On the one hand, the ICC blames the UN Security Council for not assisting the court to 
follow up the Al Bashir case. With several African countries refusing to arrest the Sudanese 
president, the court is currently powerless to effectively continue with the investigation.
102
 On the 
other hand, the ICC has suspended the investigation in Kenya because of the lack of cooperation by 
the Kenyatta government. Both Al Bashir and Kenyatta remain at the head of their respective 
governments, and have in fact enjoyed a boost in popular support because of the actions of the 
ICC. This article has shown, however, that in prosecuting sitting heads of state, the ICC is likely to 
trigger an exposure cycle that ultimately backfires on those who cooperate with the court: NGOs and 
political contestants.  
Sudan has a history of authoritarianism that can be traced back to the early 1960s, and this 
suggests that the ICC’s warrants of arrest were part of a mosaic that made it possible for Al Bashir to 
justify the marginalization of Taha and the expulsion of NGOs. Recent Kenyan history, on the other 
hand, has been characterized by political contestation which, despite its often-violent nature, signals 
a certain attitude towards political competition. However, the ICC’s investigation coupled with the 
power structures in Kenya significantly raised the stakes of the 2013 elections. In this respect, the 
prosecutions of Kenyatta and Ruto justified the formation of the Jubilee Alliance, which enjoyed the 
support of the two most influential ethnic groups in the country, the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu. 
Kenyatta and Ruto had competed over governmental positions since the late 1990s, and it seems 
unlikely that the ICC had no impact on their impromptu friendship. Many in fact regarded the 
formation of the Jubilee Alliance as part of a strategy of the Uhuruto duet to escape international 
prosecution.     
The two cases presented in this article highlight the dangers for NGOs and political 
contestants of prosecutions of sitting heads of state. However, according to Geoff Dancy and 
colleagues:  
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research is beginning to show that human rights prosecutions are associated with 
improvement in core human rights over the intermediate term, and, at a minimum, do not 
exacerbate conflict or undermine democracy.
103
   
Thus, on a global scale, the ICC is having a sought-after deterrent effect on human rights 
violations, while hampering (or at least slowing down) democratization in specific cases, as in Sudan 
and Kenya. This sparks discussion on the politicization of the ICC, which has been central to 
academic narratives since the establishment of the court and continues to dominate research in the 
field.
104
 While most commentators warn about the dangers of using the court as a political tool, 
Sarah Nouwen and Wouter Werner state that ‘defining away the ICC’s political dimensions 
eventually undermines the Court by making it look either hypocritical or utopian.’
105
 In line with the 
argument presented in this article, a more political court should be aware of the impossibility of 
prosecuting sitting heads of state in the current international arena, as well as of the consequences 
of this practice on actors such as political contestants and NGOs. The ICC should also consider the 
possibility that the spillover effects that emerged in Sudan and Kenya might manifest in all 
prosecutions that target high-ranked political figures.  
If the court acknowledges the relevance of this scenario, situations as in Sudan and Kenya 
should be avoided for the benefit of political contestants and NGOs, as well as for the ICC’s own 
sake. Solutions to the ICC dilemma outlined in this article will be shaped by the compromises that 
the international community is willing to consider. One of these compromises might be abandoning 
the idea of prosecuting sitting heads of state, but this requires reconsidering those moral 
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